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University of Vienna

Institute of Organization and Planning

International Negotiations

Course Nr. 040004

SS 2014

“Frames and Motivational Primes regarding
the Oslo I Accords”

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1. Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict lasts now for many decades and recently reached another top when Israel's ground forces invaded the Gaza Strip in order to destroy military bases of the terrorist Hamas. This conflict has cost so many lives on both, Israeli and Palestinian side, although an end of the fighting and killing is not in sight yet.

This thesis concerns the Oslo I Accords from 1993 which embodied a great breakthrough in the Mid-East conflict because Israel as well as Palestine agreed on meeting secretly in order to discuss potential solutions to create a sustainable situation with which both states can live side by side. The interesting fact surrounding the Oslo I negotiations concerns the communicative behaviour of the bargaining parties in the private talks compared to public speeches that were given at the same time. Many researchers recognized that Israeli as well as Palestinian leaders used different language styles in the differing bargaining situations which provides the basis for this thesis.

Firstly a short overview over the historical developments to the Oslo I talks will be given to give a better understanding of the underlying, long-lasting conflict. The next part describes the influence that frames have on the perception of the negotiators and leads the reader to the introduction of Kelman's Interactive Problem Solving Approach and Relational Order Theory. First one describes the importance of neutral mediators in politically tense situations while latter one concerns the power or affiliation motive of individuals in negotiations. The following points of forward- and backward-looking, as well as front- and backstage communication can be seen as characteristics of the bargaining situation between Israel and Palestine. The first chapter closes with the direct link to the Oslo I accords.

The second chapter starts with the explanation of motivational primes that affect individuals' decisions without their awareness. Afterwards the negotiating context and three of its features are presented. On one side the economic part, on the other side the relationship-concerning part regarding negotiations will be introduced. Furthermore the importance of trust will be stressed in an appropriate point. Also this chapter will close with a connection to the Oslo I talks.

Finally a conclusion will help the reader to reconsider the most important points and complete this thesis.

2. Overview over the historical developments in the conflict

The origins of the Mid-East conflict can be attributed to the Zionist movement which developed because of the worsening attitude towards Jews in Europe (American Documentary, 2001, p.1). Therefore many immigrated to Palestine with the aim to establish a Jewish state through purchasing land from the Arabian inhabitants (Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman, 2006, p. 4). In the “Balfour Declaration” from 1917 the British government expressed their support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine and moreover promised to assist the Arabs in their development of independence (American Documentary, 2001, p.1). That was the reason why the Palestinians did not accept the Balfour Declaration which caused first potential for a crisis and the number of clashes between the two cultures increased with the number of immigrating Jews (Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman, 2006, p.5).

After World War I the British government owned mandate over Palestine and ran the state until 1948 (American Documentary, 2001, p.1).

Finally in 1948 the state of Israel was established after Britain announced the ending of the



mandate. Prior to that a special committee, formed by the U.S., developed a partition plan in which the Jews should get 55% of the land while the rest remained for the Arabs who actually made up a far larger number of inhabitants (Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman, 2006, p.5).

It has to be stated that at that time the U.S. and the other states that were part of the ally against National Socialism wanted to declare their support for Jewish independence and therefore stressed the importance of their own homeland. Only one day after the official declaration of Israel, its neighbouring countries like Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan attacked the new state. Even though they were better equipped with soldiers and firepower, the Israelis won more land than they would have owned under the partition plan and now also occupied a part of Jerusalem, the most important city for Muslims (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p.121). Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman (2006) argue that the enforced resettlement of many Arabs in the neighbouring countries built the basis for the future resistance movement of the Palestinians which can be divided into the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas and Hizbollah (pp.5-6).

From 1956 to 1978 years of wars followed when in 1978 Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt that it would give back its occupied territories of Sinai. This can be seen as a very important event because Egypt was the first Arabian state which recognized Israel as independent homeland of Jews (American Documentary, 2001, pp.2-4).

In 1988 the Palestinians started the so-called "Intifada" which describes the movement motivated by inhabitants of the Gaza-Strip and the West-Bank against the Israelis who occupied the mentioned regions (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p.121). They claimed their independent state which led to negotiations between the PLO and Israel. Furthermore the U.S. acted as intermediary. The leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat accepted Israel the first time as independent state at the General UN assembly and furthermore stated that all involved countries should be able to live together in peace (American Documentary, 2001, p. 5). This can be seen as a great breakthrough for the reason that the U.S. set Palestine's recognition of Israel as a condition for future negotiations which finally also led to the Peace conferences in Madrid (Kriesberg, 2001, p.377).

In 1993 the secret, informal talks between Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin began. Israel accepted the PLO and agreed on giving limited independence to the occupied territories in the West-Bank and the Gaza-Strip (American Documentary, 2001, p.6). The Oslo I negotiation constituted a great progress, because both parties began to trust each other and discussed reasons and possible solutions for the conflict on neutral ground (Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman, 2006, p.6). Although the fighting in their countries did not stop, the talks went on which shows that both leaders already recognized the importance of stopping the violence (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p.121).

They finally decided that not all of the issues regarding the conflict can be solved right away and therefore agreed on putting effort in future negotiations which became known as “The Oslo Peace Process”. The most important outcome of the talks was that both parties officially claimed to accept the other’s right to exist and the willingness to cooperate to reach a final agreement (American Documentry, 2001, p. 6). Furthermore a Declaration of Principles was established which insisted on free elections in the West-Bank and Gaza, the withdrawal of Israeli troops and transferred power to a newly formed Palestinian Authority (Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman, 2006, p.7).

3. Framing in Negotiations

3.1 Explanation

There are many different interpretations of framing as strategic tools as well as biases in negotiations. Goffman (1974) differentiates between two classes of frameworks: natural and social ones. He describes natural frameworks as “purely physical” which means that the individual is influenced in his opinions without knowing. The social ones on the other side were adopted over time from the social environment and influence the individual’s actions because he wants them to (i.e. the perception of fairness effects the manager’s decision of wage-setting) (p.22).

Shmueli, Elliott and Kaufman (2006) on the other side describe frames as “interpretive lenses, through which each individual views and makes sense of unfolding events” (p.207). This means that an individual’s personal beliefs influence its interpretations enormously. Furthermore they emphasize the importance of distinguishing between strategic and interpretive frames (p.207). Strategic ones help individuals to influence, persuade and therefore gain advantage in negotiations while the interpretive ones help to make sense out of complex situations which individuals are likely to identify them with (pp. 208-209).

Hunt and Kernan (2005) argue that frames can be seen as individual’s valuation of outcomes regarding their feelings rather than economic outcomes. This will also influence the negotiators bargaining strategy and maybe not lead to the best possible alternative (p.129).

In conclusion the previous presented perceptions of framing show that frames influence the negotiator's behaviour in terms of how he or she feels about the whole bargaining situation. He or she has no real influence to change his or her perception besides recognizing this kind of bias and working against it.

3.2 Relational Order Theory

3.2.1 Interactive Problem-Solving Approach

In order to better understand Relational Order Theory first Kelman's (1996) Interactive Problem Solving Approach shall be introduced.


The aim of this author was to create a framework for macroeconomic conflict resolution, most of the time concerning political tensions, especially in the Mid-East conflict (p.99). The idea behind it was to bring together the two quarrelling opponents but facilitating their communication with the help of a third neutral party which does not directly interact (Demirdögen, 2011, p.216). Kelman (1996) assumes in his theory that first the parties have to notice that their conflict consists of cooperative as well as competitive components but that with an agreement, both of them will be better off than they are at the moment. For that reason the goal of the whole negotiation is to change the relationship of the bargaining parties through identifying the underlying causes and working on them. Furthermore the negotiation has to become an interactive process in which they cooperate to find their best joint-outcomes. It is important that the opponents are able to take the other's perspective to understand his or her needs better, but also to be able to influence his or her behaviour. With this strategy it is most likely that they will reach a good outcome for both of them (pp.100-101).

Donohue and Hoobler (2002) moreover argue that with Kelman's framework a good foundation can be built to establish relational communication which gave them a foundation for the development of the Relational Order Theory (p.147).

3.2.2 Relational Order Theory

To better understand Relational Order Theory, at first some terms have to be defined. Barnes-Holmes Y., Hayes, Barnes-Holmes D. and Roche (2001) define relating as responding to stimuli. In their point of view cognition and language are the tools through which responding is possible (p.103). These play a big role in negotiations and that is the reason why it is also important to distinguish between relational and tactical negotiations. First ones include a lot expenditure of time, getting to know the other party's business, as well as aiming for establishing a long-term relationship while tactical negotiations refer to less communication, less time-investment and no relationship-building behaviour (Mitchell, 2009, p.2). Furthermore Donohue and Hoobler (2002) stress that the willingness of the involved parties to negotiate in good faith is likely to lead to a good relationship between them which contributes to finding a win-win situation by re-evaluating their issues (p.146).

Another important point is that with Relational Order Theory two dimensions which reflect the interpersonal limitations among negotiating individuals have to be considered. The first one describes the interdependent relationships and the distribution of power between the bargaining parties which further influences their ability to persuade or even control the other. On the other side there is the dimension of affiliation which refers to the willingness of the negotiators to cooperate and the extent to which they communicate this willingness (Donohue and Hoobler, 2002, p.149). These two relational dimensions interact and build four relational frames:



These frames can be seen as a framework through which the attitudes of the parties can be estimated over the bargaining process by means of their communicative behaviour (Donohue and Hoobler, 2002, p.149). Donohue and Hoobler furthermore state that when looking at short-term negotiations it is possible, that primarily the dimension of interdependence is concerned, while affiliation can only develop over a longer period of time. This also can be related to the amount of trust of the bargaining parties for each other because they will only be willing to cooperate and exchange information if they do so. This furthermore can be seen as a condition for developing a relationship, for which times is needed, which concerns affiliation (p.149).

They also stress the importance of the media and the language that the bargaining parties use when giving interviews or do public statements because it is very likely that the actors have made distinctive choices respective their language. They do want to show their attitude towards an issue or manipulate the other party who in response forms its own opinion which has great effects on the relationship of the opponents. If one expresses power or the readiness to affiliate this can be seen as a sort of framing (Donohue and Hoobler, 2002, pp. 149-150).

To get the right view of the other party's motive behind its language use, Donohue and Hoobler (2002) propose to observe the motive imagery used. Winter (1994) describes motive image as "as an action (past, present, future or hypothetical), a wish or concern, or some other internal state which any speaker (...), attributes to self, to some other person, to a group or institution (including colleagues or rivals), or to people in general". He claims that there are three forms of motive imagery: achievement, affiliation and power motive imagery (p.4). Furthermore he describes which statements refer to what kind of motive imagery:

1. Descriptions of standards of excellence, positive evaluations of performances, indications of competing, winning or failing as well as extraordinary goals are examples for achievement-motive imagery (Winter, 1994, pp. 8-10).
2. On the other side he views affiliation imagery as expressions of intimacy and therefore emotional statements regarding relationships between individuals or institutions as well as friendly and collaborative actions fit into this category (Winter, 1994, pp. 12-14).
3. The last differentiation of Winter (2004) are statements of power. Actions that show how much influence one institution or person has on another, exerting control i.a. through gathering information and strong emotional expressions can be seen as motive imagery of power (pp. 15-18).

Although Donohue and Hoobler (2002) argue that motive imagery is only rarely researched in the field of negotiations, they agree with Winter (1994) that collaborative institutions, especially political ones, should homogeneously express themselves regarding their power and affiliation orientations. Research showed that most of the time expressions of power are related to hostile or even war situations while affiliation can be linked to peace.

It does make sense to look at motive imagery also in context of negotiations, because power and affiliation motive imagery used in language apparently gives hints about the parties' perceptions over their approach to conflict resolution (p.150).

3.3 Forward- and Backward-looking Frames

As already mentioned before frames can be explained as the perceptions of the conflict between the bargaining individuals. They can be differentiated in many ways, but for the Oslo I talks Donohue and Druckman (2009) distinguished between forward- and backward-looking frames because they apparently describe the direction in which the negotiating parties were working regarding their talks. Zartman and Kremenjuk (2005) therefore stress the importance of addressing past causes and future outcomes which can be seen as the establishment of peace during the conflict resolution process, because both of them are necessary to prevent future conflicts. Furthermore they argue that it may only be possible to solve one of the issues (past or future) while disregarding the other which leads to a complicated contradiction (p.1).

Therefore the difference between forward- and backward-looking negotiations has to be explained. When talking about backward-looking outcomes the bargaining parties concentrate themselves on responsibilities for past mistakes who did not help to end the conflict, but only attempted to stop the violent acts (Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman, 2006, p.7). For that reason the opponents only strive for compromise outcomes, which do not include the best solutions for both of them. Very often these negotiations are characterized by assignments of guilt for the conflict to the respectively other party and that a solution can only be reached by making large concessions (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p.124). This also refers to the "Fixed-Pie Assumption" that claims that negotiators tend to think that they can only reach their aspired goal by "beating" the other party because their objectives are directly conflictive (De Dreu, Koole and Steinel, 2000, p. 975). De Dreu, Koole and Steinel (2000)

argue that for that reason an integrative agreement becomes unlikely and that makes the situation a competitive or distributive one (p.975).

Hopmann (1995) furthermore suggests a view of Realism according to backward-looking negotiation. Realists do not believe in long-term cooperation as being reasonable to reach goals, but in the expense of others. They also see their gains only relative to these of their competitors and do not concentrate on joint outcomes. This means that they will always choose the outcome that brings their opponent relatively less than themselves, even if it was possible to increase their gain with simultaneously rising the competitors' (pp.28-29).

On the other side there is forward-looking negotiation in which the bargaining parties try to identify the underlying reasons for the conflict and work on them to create a stable environment for the future. In contrast to backward-looking negotiation they concentrate on their shared issues and collectively want to make peace sustainable (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p. 124). Hopmann (1995) sees a connection between forward-looking negotiation and theories of Liberalism that advance the view that long-term goals can only be reached through cooperation even if the issues of the opponent parties are different in the short-term. Compared to Realism with Liberalism absolute gains are higher valued than relative ones which means that not only the own, but the collective outcomes are considered (pp.28-29). Furthermore it is important to add that the bargaining parties cooperate and work together to find outcomes with which they both are satisfied (Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman, 2006, p.9)

3.4 Outbidding, Front- and Backstage Communication

Another important way to look at the Oslo I talks and official statements of politicians is through outbidding, front- and backstage communication. Outbidding in general does not only refer to communication, but also actions, that are taken besides the official negotiations from non-state actors. Only if the situation of state-actors is very secure, also they may use outbidding as a strategy to reach their goals. Most of the time, especially in ethnic and political crises, violent actions are taken by extreme supporters of their referring party. (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p.122). Their aim is to attack the hated enemy and to increase prestige that is connected to their party (Bloom, 2004, p.61).

Mitchell, Evans and O'Leary (2006) furthermore assume that outbidding is only possible or more likely to be conducted in states that are politically insecure and non-democratic with

divided societies. For that reason every ethnic group in the country thinks that it has to represent and defend its social affiliation (p.2).

Regarding other forms of the communication process, many researchers looked at Friedman's concept of front- and backstage communication. The first one describes communicative behaviour, visible to an audience (Donohue and Druckman, 2012, p.123). Clark and Salaman (1998) therefore define performance as actions taken by an individual during a distinctive period of time while being monitored. They suggest that the performer wants to evoke a certain impression of him- or herself in the view of his or her observers (p.25). Clark and Mangham (2004) state that while on stage individuals act referring to the expectations of the audience and adopt a distinctive role which hides their real purposes (p.40). With their interactions they can influence the opinions of their opponents which also plays a great role in negotiations (Clark and Salaman, 1998, p.26).

Because of the presence of risk, uncertainty and anger according to negotiations, it is important to prepare for such situations which leads to the explanation of the backstage-dimension (Clark and Salaman, 1998 p.27). There the actors generate their for the performance needed resources and are able to relax without the concerns while acting. In this kind of dimension no observation or evaluation of the audience is possible (Schlenker and Weigold, 1992, p. 152). Miller (2004) although argues that in negotiations it can be important for the opponents to establish a trusting relationship and therefore get a glimpse of the actions that are taken backstage (p.217).

Furthermore Donohue and Druckman (2009) claim that the backstage dimension can be compared to integrative negotiation situations, i.e. informal meetings of the opponents and personal discussions of the problem. The parties are more willing to cooperate and use creativity to find potential solutions for the conflict. On the other side there is frontstage communication that is similar to distributive bargaining because the individuals concentrate on their personal gains and try to achieve their best outcome. They stick to their negotiating-habits and hinder new ideas which can be seen as boundaries for conflict resolution (p.123).

3.5 Relation to the Oslo I Accords

Many different important theories for analysing the Oslo I accords have now been explained. Regarding the talks, it has to be stated that the rhetoric of the state-actors and furthermore the course of negotiation was very tightly connected to current events occurring in Israel or Palestine. As influencing indicators for establishing relationships, power, affiliation and trust can be seen. These influencing factors also fluctuated a lot among the bargaining parties, always strongly dependent on public developments in the conflict. Furthermore they help to understand the rhetoric used to create a relational context.

Therefore it has to be distinguished between state- and non-state actors. Especially in the Oslo I talks the actions taken by non-state actors had large influence on the developments in the negotiations between the state-actors. The Oslo I talks were held completely in private to not provoke violent acts of the public. Although the politicians regularly made official statements regarding the Mid-East conflict which also were affected by progresses or throwbacks in the talks (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p.120). Donohue and Druckman (2009) observed in their study that there were many statements made by redundant speakers in public and the media, both among the Palestinians and the Israeli. This leads to the conclusion that although they were not involved in the discussions directly, they also were responsible for establishing distinctive frames (p.130). This also refers to Goffman's explanation of social frames in which the actors observe developments in their environment and then are influenced by it.

When Palestinian and Israeli leaders came together in Oslo for their private talks, this was seen as a great breakthrough. Donohue and Hoobler (2002) describe the role of Norway in this context as a patient and intermediating, supporting the parties in confidence-building and providing neutral ground (p.146). This led to a cautious, positive, relational attitude among them and reinforced their willingness to share information about their goals in order to reach a peaceful agreement (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p.133).

Moreover the importance of the secrecy of this talks has to be stressed. Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman (2006) describe the Oslo I discussions with the help of Kelman's developed "Interactive Problem-Solving Approach". This framework suggests that with official negotiations, the bargaining individuals have to deal with a lot of pressure regarding the achievement of a favoured outcome. Therefore it makes more sense to exclude the public, because "backstage" they are better able to establish a relationship. Kelman's approach also

calls for a neutral third party which was embodied by Norway. Furthermore this unofficial meetings should encourage creativity and concentration on forward-looking strategies. The bargaining individuals also have time to reframe their issues which brings them to an extension of possible outcomes with which they both are satisfied (p.10).

When looking at the issues of the bargaining parties Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman (2006) draw connections to the already introduced theories of Realism and Liberalism. With Realism individuals concentrate only on their personal gain and want to demonstrate their power in order to build up a secure environment (p.8). Israel never felt itself accepted by it's neighbour-states because it was immediately attacked after it's foundation. Therefore the Israeli leaders on one side very much focused on security as a negotiation issue. On the other side they agreed on changing their policies towards Palestine which refers to the theory of Liberalism in which the parties are more open to cooperate (Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman, 2006, pp.8-9).

Now a look can be taken at the communicative behaviour of the parties. As already mentioned before, during the talks also official speeches were held but not concerning the negotiations to keep the secrecy. As initiation for these private negotiations the failure of official, public diplomacy can be seen. Both parties developed a large amount of mistrust over the decades of quarrelling and fighting which was a great barrier for establishing trust and furthermore progress in the conflict (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p.122). Both sides behaved aggressively against the other and therefore the situation can be described as being largely distributive. In order to better explain the communicative behaviour of Israeli and Palestinians, Donohue and Druckman (2009) compare the latter one's to the strategy of outbidding with which non-state actors aggressively want to enforce their issues. This cannot really be seen as a communicative pattern, because it involves violent actions. Regarding Palestine, suicide attacks very much fit into this category. They also examined more verbal styles of the parties and distinguished between front- and backstage communication. Therefore they underline in their study that public speeches were held on the frontstage-dimension while the Oslo I talks took place backstage, which means that the public did not know about them and therefore no changes could occur in the actual conflict (pp.122-124).

According to forward- and backward-looking communication, Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman (2006) examined the language that was used by the parties. They assumed that Israeli as well as Palestinian leaders would concentrate on forward-, rather than backward-looking statements because they already have overcome the point in which they were not

open to negotiation in order to find a peaceful agreement to end the conflict. Anyway their study showed that the parties did use both language-styles at about the same amount (pp.13-16). This shows that although they were ready and open to negotiate, the negotiators could not fully dissociate themselves from past events. As the main problem in this crisis the strong volition of independence of Israelis as well as Palestinians can be seen. They suffered for a very long time from the oppression of other states and had to fight over history to become independent. After World War II Israel finally was heavily supported by states all over the world to become autonomous, in order to destroy signs of the National Socialism and show acceptance and tolerance. But this was a decision made by the U.N. at the burden of Palestine which caused more potential for conflict.

Furthermore Donohue and Druckman (2009) deepened that research by examining if Palestinians, when using more backward rhetoric, would also express more mistrust and power relational frames. They found out that over the negotiations the Palestinians very much behaved mistrusting combined with statements of power and concentrated more on actual issues taken by the Israelis rather than on progress in the conflict. The authors argue that this can be seen as a basis for the outbidding process of which the negotiators also made use of. Moreover they argue that the Intifada of the Palestinians that was going on while the negotiations influenced the communication indirectly. They could afford to behave more aggressive on the negotiation table and make demands.

Regarding the Israeli leaders they suggest that it is not possible to put them in only one of the two groups (forward- or backward-looking communication behaviour) according to their communicative behaviour, but that this party switched in it's frames. Donohue and Druckman (2009) argue that this switching behaviour very much gives insight into the diverse, political opinion about how to deal with the Palestinians. One side called for a more aggressive and harder handling with the problem and imposing sanctions. The other one recognized that no solution could be found with that sort of behaviour and therefore concentrated on negotiating and making concessions. For that reason they see their switching-behaviour as an attempt to engage in forward-looking diplomacy (p.140). Therefore Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman (2006) draw the connection from forward-looking behaviour to concentration on affiliation and from backward-looking to power messages. Even if in comparison the Israelis were more forward-looking than the Palestinians, the negotiation behaviour in overall was dominated by backward-cause statements. This shows that neither of the parties really was willing to

cooperate because always the respectively other side was seen as more responsible for the conflict (pp.19-20).

4. Motivational Primes

4.1 Explanation

In order to explain the effects of primes, it is important to keep in mind that individuals tend to think that their choices and behaviour are freely chosen, illustrating their deep personal beliefs and moral concepts. Although they are very often induced by inconsiderable primes. Even individuals' goals can be influenced without them knowing (Loersch and Payne, 2011, p.234). Loersch and Payne (2011) distinguish between three priming effects on judgement, behaviour and motivation and state that it is always only possible that one, distinctive prime influences an individual the most (p. 234). To illustrate their effects they give an example in which human beings are confronted with a word regarding hostility, i.e. "aggression" or "weapon". They tend to be cognitively influenced and therefore are more likely to get motivated to behave aggressively against another individual (Loersch and Payne, 2011, p.235).

Friedman, Deci, Elliot, Moller and Aarts (2009) on the other side explain motivational primes through the concept of intrinsic motivation which says that individuals find their motivation to cope with challenges in their ability to choose how to reach their goal. In contrast to this kind of theory there is the assumption of extrinsic motivation which states that individuals only strive for the best regarding possible rewards (p.1).

4.2 Integrative and Distributive bargaining

To better understand the differences between integrative and distributive bargaining, first the behavioural options that negotiators have need to be clarified. Druckman and Olekalns (2012) compare negotiations to crises and argue that negotiators have to "choose" between four different kinds of reactions: to continue the negotiation without any kind of change, to change the issues by reframing the negotiation, to end the process, either by agreeing to all terms or

without an agreement. Their choice is largely dependent on their frame regarding the negotiation (pp. 967-968).

According to reframing, this can be seen as an integrative solution as a result from turning points. Turning points occur quite often in negotiations and mean any kind of events that lead to a change in the direction of the negotiation, but also to a change in the perception of the bargaining individuals according to the situation. They may have positive or negative impacts and the decision to reframe the relevant issues can be seen as a positive result because it motivates the negotiators to develop integrative solutions for the conflict (Druckman and Olekalns, 2012, p.967).

Moreover they refer to the cooperation of the bargaining parties and for that reason the likelihood to combine their differing interests increases which leads to the maximization of their joint benefit. Therefore the individuals are responsible for finding these opportunities in which their personal pay-off is not the same across all issues (Yukl, Malone, Hayslip and Pamin, 1976, p.277). Also integrative solutions play a great role in establishing long-term relationships because they additionally lead to positive conceptions about the negotiation (Carnevale and Isen, 1996, p.2). Yukl, Malone, Hayslip and Pamin (1976) suggest that although most negotiations offer opportunities for integrative solutions, they very often are not recognized from the negotiators which leads to losses on both sides. As very common reasons i.e. time pressure and order of the issue settlement can be seen (p. 277).

As the opposite of integrative bargaining, distributive negotiating can be seen in which the individuals only concentrate on their personal gain. This perception towards the negotiation may hinder potential joint benefits and also the creativity is bordered in advance. Moreover the individuals accept to act at the expense of the other party which decreases the likelihood of an agreement because this behaviour may lead to excessive conflicts and the relationship of the parties suffers enormously (Schurr and Ozanne, 1985, pp.939-940).

That leads to the conclusion that the perception of the negotiators regarding the conflict is largely dependent on the reactions of their counterpart and this raises the question which indicators influence their behaviour which furthermore asks for an explanation of the negotiating context (Druckman and Olekalns, 2012, p.968).

4.3 The Negotiating context

Gelfand and Brett (2004) define the negotiation context as the broad environment in which the negotiation is embedded. This can be groups to which the negotiators refer, as well as third, intermediating parties or available technology (p.xv). Anyway they stress the importance of considering that the negotiation context very much shapes the dynamics of the conflict and influences its direction. Moreover they also see trust or distrust as affecting indicators and therefore describe the term “intergroup paranoia” which expresses the self-identification with a group and therefore means an individual’s beliefs that the own group is threatened or endangered by another one. For that reason negotiators may not be interested in cooperating and cannot gather information (p.213).

Druckman and Olekalns (2012) draw a close connection between the negotiating context and the strategic choices of the opponents regarding their following behaviour. They state that they especially work as motivational indicators and therefore frame negotiator’s reactions.

Furthermore they argue that the context has great influence on how the bargaining parties perceive the situation and therefore concentrate on three different characteristics of the context: transaction cost, shared identity and level of dependence. They also compare these three to the concept of Relational Order Theory which was explained in the first chapter of this thesis. Regarding transaction cost, they refer to the calculating, economic side of negotiations which means outweighing costs and benefits. There a connection to achievement in ROT can be drawn that also concentrates on physical outcomes rather than the bargaining process. On the other side shared identity can be found which incorporates relationships between individuals. Therefore a comparison can be made to affiliation in ROT which describes the development of trust and in addition the exchange of information in order to reach an agreement. The last characteristic, level of dependence is largely combined with power, which is also explained in ROT. It describes that if one party is more dependent on the other, this automatically produces a situation of unequally distributed power which can furthermore lead to exploitation (p.968).

The different influencing factors of the negotiating context have now roughly been defined. Now a closer look can be taken at each of them.

4.3.1 Transaction Costs

Transaction costs stand in the focus of many economic researchers for a very long time. Their approach was more and more developed from different economists. Williamson (1981) argues that with transaction costs an organization's efficiency can be measured (p.549). The theory in general can be seen as a framework for strategic and rational calculations and therefore they refer to comparing costs and benefits of the bargaining process (Druckman and Olekalns, 2012, p.968). Moreover they can be divided chronologically into direct and opportunity costs. Further ones refer to the management of the relationship between the bargaining parties which is dependent on the behaviour of them (Druckman and Olekalns, 2012, p.968). Williamson (1981) therefore defines the term "bounded rationality" that shall express the uncertainty and risk that are related to negotiations. He states that individuals are limited in their resources and also cannot gather all information that would prevent them from getting exploited (p.551). Furthermore human beings are not always possible to make choices completely rational, because they are influenced by their environment and emotions. Also trust has great influence on processing and gathering information between the bargaining parties. As already mentioned before, because of that bounded rationality the risk of getting exploited rises. Therefore he explains the term of opportunism to describe the willingness of bargaining individuals to behave self-serving and unfair in order to achieve their goals (p.554). Wathne and Heide (2000) furthermore argue that with opportunism the underlying transaction costs increase because more resources have to be spent on controlling and monitoring the other party to not get betrayed (p.36). Cross (1977) adds time delay and coercion (i.e. of authorities) as influencing factors to the transaction cost approach (p.593). This makes sense because the more time a negotiation takes, the higher the accompanied costs will be. Furthermore very often authoritarian individuals stress their inferiors to reach a distinctive, favourable result. Regarding time pressure, Druckman (1994) examined in his study that the more pressure the individuals were exposed to, the more compromising and quicker agreements could be observed (p.531). With time pressure the individuals tend to concentrate only on the outcome of the negotiation and forget about the process and how to achieve their goals. Therefore it can also be seen as a barrier for the individuals' creativity and Druckman's studies showed that it is unlikely that they will find their best joint-outcome.

As already mentioned before, the bargaining individuals outweigh the costs and benefits arising in a bargaining situation in order to decide whether a negotiation is reasonable or not.

Cramton (1991) states that the party that enfaces less bargaining costs (which means that it could afford the negotiation not to take place) is more likely to make a last offer and therefore sets the other one under pressure to decide (p.1221). On the other side, if costs exceed potential profits, the bargaining individuals will be more likely to terminate or at least delay their negotiation (Druckman and Olekalns, 2012, p.969).

As the transaction cost approach can be seen as the more economic, calculating part of the negotiation context, now the features concerning the relationship between the individuals can be explained.

4.3.2 Shared identity

Druckman and Olekalns (2012) describe “shared identity” as the tendency of human beings to compare and furthermore evaluate themselves relatively to others (p.969). Therefore this plays a great role in negotiations because a shared identity, meaning that the individuals perceive their preferences and identities as similar, may moderate the relationship between them (Hinds and Mortensen, 2005, p.291). Hinds and Mortensen (2005) furthermore stress the importance of communication to actually find these similarities which might simplify the whole bargaining process. They also state that human beings create “in-groups” and “out-groups” with which they categorize colleagues whether they can identify themselves with or not. This categorization also is based on finding similarities. If the other party does not exhibit a shared identity, it automatically is perceived as hostile and it’s behaviour is negatively evaluated (pp.291-292). For negotiation this means that it is more likely that the bargaining parties reach an agreement if they find some commonalities between them. On the other side they are not able to identify some and therefore it is possible that the negotiation turns into a distributive situation.

Gelfand et al. (2007) examined a theory about the “Relational Self-Construals” (RSC) explaining that individuals’ identities and behaviour are not only dependent on themselves, but that social processes very much influence the establishment of personalities. He therefore defines “the self” as “a multidimensional, dynamic knowledge structure that organizes self-relevant information” (pp.5-6). RSC furthermore have great influence on the processing of information about oneself and others, as well as on emotions and affect-regulation (p.8). If RSC is accessible for individuals, they are likely to identify negotiations as opportunities to

establish a relationship through cooperation. Attentive negotiators that concentrate more on the establishment of a long-term relationship, rather than on short-term outcomes will also be to maximize their joint outcome rather than individual goals (p.22).

Druckman and Olekalns (2012) compared shared identities to the previously presented Relational Order Theory. They draw a connection to the affiliation motive, which also concentrates on establishing a relationship and increasing joint-outcomes, rather than competitive behaviour and maximizing individual gains. They go a step further by assuming that exactly relationships encourage negotiators to overcome crises so that the stalemate itself becomes a motivator for continuing negotiations. That means that shared identities and values increase the willingness of cooperation because the whole bargaining process is more seen as shared challenge (p.970). Druckman, Olekalns and Smith (2009) therefore divide influencing factors into external and internal ones. First ones refer to the already mentioned crises or stalemates. The researchers found evidence that crises are more likely to be overcome if the bargaining process is perceived as being cooperative, rather than distributive. Second ones mean internal attitudes of the individuals towards the negotiation, i.e. high trust will increase the possibility of an agreement (p.2).

With the perception of a shared challenge rather than a competitive situation, the bargaining parties are willing to take some risk by generating new ideas in order to solve the conflict. In a stalemate this may lead them to the reframing of their issues (Druckman and Olekalns, 2012, p.970).

In order to identify shared identities in a negotiation, the necessity of negotiations first has to be recognized. This leads to the annotation of Ripeness theory.

4.3.2.1 Ripeness Theory

Zartman (2001) very much researched into the causes of especially political negotiations and the motivations of the individuals behind it. He argues that one of the most important conditions that has to be met in order to start a negotiation in a very deep developed conflict is the timing. The parties really have to feel uncomfortable and not to be able to find another way out which brings them to the “ripe moment” in which they finally are willing to negotiate. He states that most of the time a “Mutually Hurting Stalemate” or an enormous catastrophe is the motivator for quarrelling human beings to enter negotiations. These can

only be identified through a calculating cost- and benefit-analysis of the underlying situation. Furthermore a lot of tension has to be related to the actual crisis which puts lots of pressure onto politicians so that they look for an alternative way out than escalation. He also indicates that ripeness is only an important event, but not the only condition for the initiation of negotiations. The bargaining individuals themselves are responsible for it's recognition and inception. Unfortunately not all ripe moments are transformed into negotiations. Although ripeness theory can be seen as a prescriptive framework for identifying necessary indicators (pp.8-9).

Now the first influencing factor according to the relationships of the bargaining parties has been presented. As shared identities can be compared to the affiliation motive and furthermore the willingness to cooperate of individuals, a closer look has to be taken at the other, individual-concentrated side according to negotiations.

4.3.3 Level of dependence

Once again a connection can be drawn from level of dependence to Relational Order theory. Druckman and Olekalns (2012) therefore compare it to the power motive in negotiations. They furthermore argue that the relationship between the bargaining parties very much concerns their level of dependence on each other. They even suggest that power can exactly be defined as the extent to which an individual is dependent upon the other and that if this connection increases, power will decrease. ROT says that dependency among the parties leads them to negotiate until they reach a suitable agreement. Even if they reach a stalemate or impasse they are more likely to continue than in non-dependent situations (p.970).

Olekalns and Smith (2009) therefore stated power embodies a central role in social exchange theory (p.350). Social exchange is described by Emerson (1976) as “a two-sided, mutually contingent, and mutually rewarding process involving *transactions* or simply *exchange*” and therefore negotiations perfectly fit into that category (p.336). In this theory power is perceived as the ability to control the opponent (p.338). For further explanations it has to be added that power can be seen as an attribute of the underlying relationship or of the individuals themselves. As a feature of relationships it represents a motivator for the further, dynamic advancement of these social exchanges. In negotiations this means that the bargaining individuals are dependent on each other to the extent that each action taken by one influences

the outcome of the other (Olekalns and Smith, 2009, p.350). Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) indicate that dependency is only possible because of scarce resources provided on the market. Therefore it is related to the amount of alternatives between the bargainers can choose, i.e. a private person is only little dependent on a distinctive seller of fruits because there are many suppliers of them (p.170). This also applies to negotiations: if a company XY wants to close a joint-venture-contract, XY's power is dependent on the demand for joint-venture contracts at the moment. If many smaller companies are interested in that kind of contracts with XY, it's power is higher than that of the potential partners. Furthermore with low dependence the party is less likely to walk away from the negotiation and concentrates more on establishing a harmonious relationship (Olekalns and Smith, 2009, p.351). Therefore Van Kleef et al. (2006) state that powerful individuals tend to be more goal-oriented and have more resources which provides the ability to do so (p.559).

Furthermore Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) distinguish between two different dimensions regarding dependency: power imbalance and mutual dependence. First one refers to the proportional distribution of power among the bargaining individuals, meaning that one is more powerful than the other. Mutual dependence on the other side sees the negotiators as bilateral dependent and concentrates not on the individual amount of power, but on the average dependencies (p.170). If both parties have the same amount of power they are mutually dependent. It also has to be considered that in non-mutual relationships it is likely that the more powerful party will use threats and other dominant strategies to reach it's individual goals. Because of the increased use of persuasive arguments and personal attacks the negotiating behaviour in general can be seen as less effective. Furthermore it leads the bargaining parties to a more defensive behaviour and deceptive strategy (Olekalns and Smith, 2009, p.350). Olekalns and Smith (2009) moreover found out that individuals, that have to face more dependency, tend to give away more information than stronger parties because they fear that the betrayal of the stronger bargainer may lead him or her to turn away which would lead to immense losses on the side of the dependent party (p.350). Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) as a conclusion argue that power imbalance and mutual dependency always have to be considered together because in any situation where power is imbalanced among the actors, it is possible to find a dependent relation that is characterized by varying levels of mutual dependence (p.170).

The different characteristics according to negotiator's behaviour have now been examined. Shared identity as well as level of dependence show the importance of relationships among

the negotiating parties. Another very important indicator for establishing such a connection is trust.

4.4 Trust

Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) describe trust as “an individuals’ belief in, and willingness to act on the basis of the words, actions, and decisions of another”. The ability to develop trust is based on experiences over an individual’s lifetime and also on norms and rules of society. It can be distinguished between personal and professional trust but for negotiations only the second one is relevant because it refers to the achievement of distinctive goals (p.87).

Ring and Van De Ven (1994) argue that trust can be defined in two different ways. First one is very similar to Lewicki’s and Wiethoff’s perception because it says that trust refers to the predictability of the opponent’s behaviour while the second definition sees it as general belief in the other party’s goodwill (p.93). With trust the negotiators tend to be reliable and fair in their actions although a possibility for opportunism is given. From this definitions the three columns of trust can be deviated: reliability, predictability and fairness. Furthermore it can be distinguished between relational and dispositional trust. Latter one describes an individual’s general belief in the trustworthiness of others while relational trust concentrates on a distinctive person in a dyadic bargaining situation (Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998, 143). Moreover trust plays a very big role in interdependent relationships, such as negotiations, because it helps to reduce the risk involved (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998, p.425). This leads to difficulties in exact these bargaining situations as most of the time relationships only develop over a longer period of time. With professional negotiations, individuals very often meet for the very first time and therefore they cannot base their decisions on the reliability of the other person from the beginning (McKnight, Cummings and Chervany, 1998, p.473). They form an opinion based on available information, personal impressions and also the negotiating context, which was explained earlier in this thesis, has great influence (Druckman and Olekalns, 2012, pp.971-972). Donohue and Druckman (2009) therefore describe the term “knowledge-based-trust” which refers to the willingness of the bargaining individuals to cooperate, share information and reach their desired outcome. In contrast to it stands identity-based-trust that concentrates on similar values and goals among the bargaining parties which brings them to the recognition of a shared identity (p.126). Earlier in this thesis it has been

explained that if the bargaining parties find a shared identity among themselves, they are very likely to reach an agreement. When facing a crisis, they will either continue negotiating till they reach a suitable outcome for both of them or reframe their issues to find new, better solutions. It has been proven that with shared identities the negotiators are willing to accept problems rising within the process better because of the high initial trust which leads them to a stronger belief in reaching an agreement (Druckman and Olekalns, 2012, p.973).

Although it has to be considered that with the latter type of trust more risk and vulnerability is involved because it is not based on secure facts but on assumptions and feelings (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p.126). This leads to the interpretation that the negotiators are more likely to concentrate on a satisfying joint-outcome if the established relationship is good rather than mistrust dominates the whole process.

The amount of trust in negotiations also refers to transaction costs. With reaching an agreement much risk is involved because it is based on the assumption that the opponent behaved and acted fairly during the negotiation process. Because of that risk transaction costs are increased. Only trust can help to reduce these costs because it offers some kind of security that the other party will not behave opportunistically (Druckman and Olekalns, 2012, p.972). Therefore it makes sense to divide it into low and high levels in the negotiation context. With low levels the bargaining situation will spread over a longer period of time and the bargaining parties will be faced with more difficulties and disagreements during the process which can be led back to the increasing fear of getting exploited. Especially unexpected behaviour decreases interpersonal trust immensely as predictability constitutes a basis of trust. On the other side with high levels of trust the interpersonal exchange will be more efficient and even if disagreements appear, the parties will not immediately think of opportunistic behaviour and therefore the sum of conflict is reduced (Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998, p.145).

This leads to the understanding that trust is one of the most important indicators for negotiations because individuals are not always able to take rational choices and listen to their feelings and perceptions about a distinctive situation. According to motivational primes, trust can be seen as the basis of entering in, staying in and finishing a successful negotiation.

After examining the different characteristics of motivational primes now a connection can be drawn to the Oslo I Accords.

4.5 Relation to the Oslo I Accords

According to the Oslo I talks it is difficult to determine whether the communicative situation between Israeli and Palestinian leaders was integrative or distributive. This is due to the changing messages in the private talks and in official speeches (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p.130). Tripscha, Donohue and Druckman (2006) draw a connection from the already presented forward-looking communication to integrative bargaining because both include the willingness to make concessions (p.9). When comparing the parties in the bargaining process, more integrative communication could be observed from the Israeli leaders, although distributive behaviour predominated the secret talks (p.16). In order to describe distributive communication related to the Oslo Accords it is important to reconsider that while the talks secretly continued in Norway, Palestinian civilians fought for their independence and their own state. This encouraged their bargaining leaders to make demands in the negotiations, but even more important was their language used in interviews and speeches. Officially they had to appear aggressive and incompilant towards Israel to support the nation's attitude at the moment (Donohue and Druckman, 2009, p. 140).

At this point a relation to the negotiating context can be drawn that describes the environment in which the process takes place. It has to be stated that Palestinian as well as the Israeli population is shaped from it's great solidarity to the nation because of their century-lasting struggling for independence and acceptance. According to the Intifada, that took place in the time of the secret talks, it also put a lot of pressure onto the Palestinian, bargaining individuals because they hardly had a choice in their official communication. Firstly the revolting Palestinians also embodied their voters and secondly they constituted a big part of the Palestinian population. This leads to the conclusion that with showing some conciliation towards Israel they would have risked their own political positions and a rebellion against themselves. From the view of Israel therefore the willingness to cooperate might have been reduced. Even if the Palestinians would have used more integrative language in the private talks (which in reality was not the case, they even used more power messages than the Israeli leaders) they still would have engaged the public opinion against Israel because of their official propaganda and this furthermore creates a great barrier for establishing a trusting relationship and reaching an agreement.

Donohue and Druckman (2009) therefore also examined the expressions of trust among the bargaining individuals. They found out that the Palestinian leaders showed more signs of

mistrust in general and draw a connection from these expressions to the claiming of justice. Examining official speeches of them, they found evidence that especially signs of mistrust were connected to lack of progress in the talks. Moreover both parties used about the same amount of knowledge trust while nearly avoiding identity-related trust which leads to the conclusion that both parties did not want to find similarities among them (pp.137-139). This can historically be interpreted as Palestine advancing the view that the whole development of the state Israel was conducted unfairly and they still see the opponent nation as thief of their land. On the other side Israel insisted on its right to exist and was not willing to cooperate if Palestine further promoted an attitude against it while the Intifada still was going on.

Looking at transaction costs it can be said that for the Oslo I talks these must have been very high because of the lacking trust among the bargaining parties, it was difficult to gather information. Furthermore the whole process can be seen as more emotional than rational as the process in which Israel as well as Palestine concentrated more on past events and assignments of guilt rather than establishing a good relationship for the future. Although both parties must have outweighed the costs and benefits of negotiating and it can be seen as progress that they finally decided to enter a bargaining process by recognizing the need for a peaceful agreement.

Pruitt (2005) argues that Israel was very much weakened by the Intifada that showed no signs of coming to an end which caused very high costs. On the other side Palestine had to deal with economic problems because of the retaliation of the Soviet Union, that acted as their supporter and some problems with other Arabian states that angled for recompense. Furthermore both states feared the rise of Islamic fundamentalists. All these situations and developments can be seen as shared problems which brought them to "the ripe moment" in which they were willing to find a solution (pp.1-2). He furthermore describes the reason why both nations were not able to keep their peaceful attitudes for a longer period of time as the ability of them to solve some of their problems. Palestine could cope with its financial and economic problems while Israel assimilated the consequences of the first Intifada and dissociated itself from this event (p.1).

5. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to provide the reader a better understanding of the communication used by the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators during the Oslo I Accords. This conflict has deep historical roots and therefore the willingness of both parties to discuss potential solutions could be seen as an extraordinary event.

Relational Order Theory very well described their communicative behaviour and concentrated on two main points. On one side the power motive can be found which both parties did use although it could be observed more often in the language of Palestinian leaders which also expressed more mistrust than their opponents. The communication style of the Israelis was characterized by switching between forward- and backward looking frames. In this case first ones concentrate on establishing a peaceful future relationship while latter ones concern past issues and want to claim justice. The communicative behaviour of both parties very well expresses their uncertainty about their intentions. They furthermore were not able to develop their good starting-point into a trusting relationship that would have been needed so much to find an agreement.

On one side they know that the fighting, that cost so many lives, must come to an end but on the other side they are not willing to forget about the past. Because of that uncertainty about how to behave the right way, both were so much influenced by their environment which led them into a conflict spiral.

Recently the conflict reached another top when Israeli ground troops invaded the Gaza Strip. Terrorist groups, with which the Israelis refuse to negotiate, have already risen among Palestinian civilians because of the continuing fighting and fear. This time the world watches and nobody agreed on acting as a mediator by now.

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